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RETIREMENT SAVINGS IN THE FACE OF
INCREASING LONGEVITY: THE ADVANTAGES
OF DEFERRING RETIREMENT
CHASE A. TWEEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States retirement plan system exists in a world
of rapidly changing economic variables. Assuming Congress's
commitment to the policies underlying the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA)1 remains constant, how does it
confront issues of rising living costs, 2 rising healthcare costs,3 a
drying well of risk-appropriate investment opportunities,4 and
heightening "race to the bottom"5  pressures from global
competitors? Among the growing threats to the sustainability of
the U.S. retirement system is increasing longevity.6 These threats
* Mr. Tweel is a 2010 LLM candidate at the Georgetown University Law Center in
Washington, D.C.
1. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
ERISA].
2. See Harry Wallop and Edmund Conway, Cost of Living to Keep Rising as Oil
and Food Hit Record Highs TELEGRAPH.Co.UK (June 9, 2008), available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/majornews/2100048/Cost-of-living-to-keep-rising-
as-oil-and-food-hit-record-highs.html ("The price of food, clothes, petrol and other
goods are set to climb far faster than most salaries - leading to a severe downturn in
families standard of living.").
3. See Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois, Understanding Rising Health Care
Costs, http://www.bcbsil.com /PDF/healthcarecosts.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2010)
("Some of the factors that contribute to the rising cost of medical care - such as an
aging population - are beyond anyone's control. As people reach middle age, they
tend to require more medical care, a fact that many graying Baby Boomers have
come to appreciate.").
4. See DAVID M. SMICK, THE WORLD IS CURVED: HIDDEN DANGERS TO THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 2-31 (Penguin Group 2008).
5. See id. at 2-10 (discussing the effects of globalization).
6. Sweeping demographic changes have led many experts to question whether
our nation can provide retirement income and medical benefits to the future elderly
at levels comparable to those of today. S. REP. No. 107-158, at 24 (2002). There is
concern that the baby boom is not saving adequately for retirement, yet it is unlikely
that Social Security benefits will be increased. Id. To the contrary, the age for
unreduced benefits will rise to 67 early in the 21st century, amounting to a benefit
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concern not only the welfare of future retirees and their employers
but also a large number of financial institutions who increasingly
offer retirement plan products and services. This article examines
the possible changes that policymakers may wish to consider to
brace the retirement plan system for this phenomenon and, in
doing so, endorses policy reforms that incentivize the deferral of
retirement. 8
Part II of this paper summarizes the structure, policies,
evolution, and current status of the U.S. retirement plan system.9
Part III describes in detail the issue of increasing longevity and
introduces a number of possible solutions, grouping the solutions
into two broad categories: reforms aimed at increasing savings and
reforms aimed at deferring retirement.' ° Part III also analyzes the
relative strengths and weaknesses of reforms aimed at increasing
savings." Part IV argues that private pension reform should
include policies that encourage the deferral of retirement.12
II. THE U.S. RETIREMENT PLAN SYSTEM
The current U.S. model of retirement savings was
structured early in the twentieth century around a tripartite system
of private pensions, personal savings, and Social Security, 3
frequently referred to as the "three-legged stool.' 14 The private
pension leg of this metaphorical stool has morphed into two
general types of employer provided retirement plans - the more
reduction, and further cuts are being contemplated. Id. Thus, lawmakers,
economists, consultants, and others concerned about retirement income security will
likely continue to seek reforms in the private pension system. Id.
7. See generally Wachovia Products and Services, https://www.wachovia.com/
corp-inst (last visited Jan. 30, 2010), Employee Benefit Plans, http://www.bbt.com/
bbt/business/products/employeebenefits.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (showing the
broad range of retirement and employee benefit services offered by large banking
institutions).
8. See infra Part IV (discussing policies aimed at deferring retirement).
9. See infra Part II, pp. 104-12.
10. See infra Part III, pp. 112-30.
11. See infra Part III, pp. 112-30.
12. See infra Part IV, pp. 130-37.
13. Regina Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA.
TAX REV. 607,612, n.17 (2000).
14. Patricia E. Dilley, Hope We Die Before We Get Old: The Attack on
Retirement, 12 ELDER L.J. 245, 252 (2004).
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traditional type of pension plan, the defined benefit plan,15 and the
defined contribution plan. 6  Congress passed the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act in 1974 to regulate these
employer provided retirement plans and to protect the interests of
plan participants.17
A. Pre-ERISA
Employee benefit plans had been in existence long before
the passage of ERISA. 18 American Express established the first
private pension plan in 1875.19 The law surrounding early pension
and benefit plans was slow to recognize the policy virtue of
encouraging such plans. For instance, some courts treated
pensions like gratuities, revocable at will by the employer, ° and
other courts treated pensions as unilateral contracts2
By the 1920s, U.S. tax law had encouraged the growth of
pension plans.22  Recognizing that pensions are deferred
compensation, the Revenue Act of 1926 permitted employers to
deduct contributions to pension plans and taxed employees only
upon the distribution of the benefits. 23  Furthermore, the act
allowed the earnings of the contributions held in trust to be tax
exempt.2
The passage of the Social Security Act of 1935 reflected a
national policy commitment to the welfare of retirees. 2' By itself,
however, Social Security is "merely a floor incapable of replacing
15. See infra Part II.C (discussing defined benefit and defined contribution
plans).
16. Id.
17. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
18. Military pensions existed in Plymouth Colony in 1936. See Israel Goldowitz,
Introduction to Employee Benefits Law: Background on Employee Benefit Plans
and ERISA 2 (2009) (unpublished, on file with author).
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 213, 44 Stat. 26 (1926).
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
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income for most American workers., 26  Congress expected the
other two legs of the stool, private pension and personal savings, to
fill the gap.27 Subsequent legislation more specifically targeted
private pensions. The Revenue Act of 1942 created coverage and
nondiscrimination requirements for pensions.28 The Welfare and
Pension Plan Disclosure Act of 195829 imposed certain disclosure
requirements regarding pensions to the Department of Labor.3"
Public support for comprehensive federal regulation of pensions
was lukewarm until the "spectacular failure" of the automobile
manufacturer, Studebaker.3'
The closing of the Studebaker automobile plant in South
Bend, Indiana, is generally regarded as the pivotal event in the
history of the movement toward comprehensive federal regulation
of private retirement plans.32 In 1963, Studebaker announced that
it was closing its manufacturing plant in South Bend, Indiana, and
consolidating its remaining auto manufacturing activity at its plant
in Hamilton, Ontario, resulting in more than 7,000 lost jobs.33 The
workers were covered under a pension plan, and when the plant
closed, Studebaker terminated the plan.34  Although the
termination implemented default priorities, many of the
employees fell into a "non-vested" category and lost their
pensions.35  Lawmakers capitalized on the media coverage of
Studebaker to build public support for comprehensive pension
reform.36 Indeed, public opinion "coalesced around the idea of
federal protection of pensions, based on concerns about
mismanagement of assets, forfeiture of pension rights, and default
26. Goldowitz, supra note 18, at 2.
27. See id., at 7.
28. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798 (1942).
29. Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act, Pub. L. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958).
30. United States Department of Labor, http://www.dol.gov.
31. See Goldowitz, supra note 18, at 2.
32. Origin of ERISA, http://www.erisalawfirm.com/erisa/faq/q/originof-erisa
(last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See Goldowitz, supra note 18, at 3.
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ERISA
by failing businesses," thereby setting the stage for the passage of
ERISA.37
B. Reform and ERISA
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act. 8 ERISA introduced broad changes to all
employee benefit plans, and the legislative history indicates that it
was passed to provide protection to participants' rights under such
plans.39 Furthermore, ERISA provides employers with a uniform
set of requirements regarding standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligations under such plans. 4° Like most sweeping legislation,
ERISA represents a balancing of interests. For example, rather
than requiring immediate vesting, ERISA requires employees to
work for certain minimum periods to have an enforceable right to
a benefit.41 Additionally, it permits funding over a period of time
42
rather than full funding at all times. Perhaps the most important
interests ERISA struggles to balance involve revenue. While tax-
favored treatment is necessary to encourage the formation of
qualified pension plans, there are revenue concerns if too many tax
dollars are lost.
43
C. Defined Benefit Versus Defined Contribution Plans
There are two fundamental categories of retirement plans -
defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans." Under a
defined benefit plan, employees are promised a level of retirement
37. Id.
38. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
39. KATHRYN J. KENNEDY AND PAUL T. SCHULTZ III, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW:
QUALIFICATION AND ERISA REQUIREMENTS, § 1.01, at 1 (Matthew Bender & Co.
2006).
40. Id.
41. See infra Part III.C.1 B (discussing vesting rules under ERISA).
42. See infra Part III.C.1 A (discussing funding rules under ERISA).
43. Goldowitz, supra note 18, at 1.
44. See, e.g., Jay Conison, Employee Benefit Plans 3 (3d. ed. 2003).
2010]
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income according to a formula.45 The formula may be based on
the employee's years of service.4 Alternatively, the formula may
be independent of the employee's years of service. 7  For
employees who terminate their service prior to retirement, an
accrued benefit formula provides an annual level of accrual, to be
paid at the normal retirement age as a life annuity or joint life
annuity.48 The sponsor who establishes a defined benefit plan
must contribute funds to the plan trust on a continual basis.50
These funds are invested, and the investment performance affects
the employer's future contribution obligations. The plan's
investment performance does not, however, affect the level of
benefits to which the employee is entitled. 1 In other words, under
a defined benefit plan, the employer bears the exposure to market
risk. The employee, on the other hand, is insulated from market
risk.
Under defined contribution plans, the structure provides
for employer or employee contributions, or a combination of both,
that will accumulate over time in an individual account; the
employee's individual account is credited with investment earnings
or capital gains or losses.52 The resulting balance in the employee's
account is the amount available to the employee.53 Once the
employer contribution is made to the plan, the employer
obligation is fulfilled and the investment risk shifts to the
45. See Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.)
(providing further that a "defined benefit plan" is not an individual account plan).
46. See Conison, supra note 44 (explaining that a plan that employs this type of
formula is a "unit benefit plan). For example, a plan's formula for the annual
retirement benefit might be: (Years of service) x (final average salary) x 1.5%. Id.
47. See id. at 4 (providing further that a plan that employs this type of formula is
"flat benefit (or fixed benefit) plan"). This type of plan may provide either a fixed
dollar amount or a fixed percentage of final or average pay on retirement. Id.
48. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Pension Funding Reform: It's Time to Get the Rules
Right (Part I) BNA TAX ANALYST, Tax Notes, 907, 910 (Aug. 22, 2005).
49. Typically, the plan sponsor is the employer; see Conison, supra note 44, at 4.
50. See infra Part III. 1.B.1 (discussing contributions rules and possible changes
to these rules).
51. See id. (explaining that if a plan invests in common stocks, market gains may
reduce, and market losses may increase, the employer's obligation to contribute to
the plan in future years).
52. 26 U.S.C. § 414(i) (2006) (referring to defined contribution plans as individual
account balances).
53. Kennedy, supra note 48, at 910.
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employee.54 There are a variety of kinds of defined contribution
plans. For example, under a money purchase plan, the employer is
obligated to contribute "a specified dollar amount each year to
each participant's account."55  Another kind of defined
contribution plan is a target benefit plan, which is essentially a
species of money purchase plans and has characteristics of both
defined benefit and defined contribution plans.56 Under a target
benefit plan, the employer determines a target level of benefits
and then actuarially determines a contribution level sufficient to
fund those benefits. 7 Unlike a defined benefit plan, the target
level of benefits is only a projection and not a guarantee. The
most prevalent type of defined contribution plan is a profit sharing
plan, which provides for annual employer contributions, and their
allocation to employees' accounts pursuant to a formula - the
amount of the employer's contribution may be set by a formula or
left to the employer's discretion. In addition to profit sharing
plans, there are many other similar, more specialized defined
contribution plans such as stock bonus plans,6° employee stock
ownership plans (ESOP),6' cash or deferred arrangements
(CODA),62 and cash balance plans.63
Over the last several decades, the U.S. retirement system
has witnessed a shift from defined benefit pension plans to various
54. Id.
55. Conison, supra note 44 at 5 (explaining that typically, the specified amount is
a percentage of the participant's compensation).
56. 26 U.S.C. § 414(k) (2006).
57. Conison, supra note 44, at 5.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(iii) (2006) (providing that a "stock bonus plan"
distributes benefit in the form of employer stock).
61. See 26 U.S.C. § 4975(e)(7) (2006) (explaining that an ESOP is a stock bonus
plan or combination stock bonus and money purchase plan designed to invest in the
stock of the employer).
62. See id. at § 401(k) (explaining that this gives participants the choice of having
the employer contribute money to their accounts in the plan or pay the same amount
to them as current compensation).
63. See Conison, supra note 44, at 6. (explaining that a cash balance plan is
essentially a type of defined benefit plan where the benefit for each participant is
calculated by reference to a hypothetical account, in which the participant is credited
with hypothetical allocations plus interest at a rate determined by the plan; unlike a
defined contribution plan, the participant's ultimate benefit is not affected by
investment performance).
2010] ERISA
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types of defined contribution plans. 64 This trend may constitute a
threat to the U.S. retirement system. Among the age group forty-
seven to sixty-four, the rate of increase of median pension wealth
has steadily declined over the last several decades. 6' Also, median
net worth excluding defined contribution pension plans fell by
4.3% between 1983 and 2001. 66  Overall, median "private
accumulations" fell by 2.2% for those aged forty-seven to sixty-
four.6' The inequality of total pension wealth increased
substantially between 1983 and 2001. 68 This trend is traceable to
the switchover from defined benefit plans to defined contribution
"accounts., 69 While traditional defined benefit plans once had an
equalizing effect on overall household wealth, "the switch to
defined contribution plans has had the opposite effect."7 ° While
the defined contribution plan may in some ways be a virtuous
device for retirement savings,71 policymakers should, for these
72reasons, guard against the extinction of the defined benefit plan.
D. Tax Code as Policy Lever
Congress does not require employers to have ERISA-
qualified plans.73  Instead, it encourages the formation and
64. See Dilley, supra note 14, at 254 (explaining that "[the] change from defined
benefit pension plans to various types of defined contribution, or essentially
employee savings plans, has been underway for decades, but has probably greatly
accelerated in the last twenty years").
65. See Edward N. Wolff, The Unraveling of the American Pension System 1983-
2001, Nat'l ACAD. OF SOC. INS., IN SEARCH OF RETIREMENT SECURITY: THE
CHANGING MIX OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 14 (Nelly Ganesan & Teresa Ghilarducci eds.) (illustrating that the
increase in median pension wealth between 1983 and 2001 has only been eighteen
percent ($42,400 to $ 50,000)).
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. Dilley, supra note 14, at 255.
71. See Peter S. Heller, Rethinking Public Pension Reform Initiatives, IMF
WORKING PAPER SERIES, No. 98/61 (Feb. 2006) (explaining that "[a defined
contribution] pillar can play a useful supplemental role in a multi-pillar system for the
accumulation of pension savings").
72. See infra Part III.C.2 B (discussing the policy benefits of encouraging
defined benefit plans).
73. See Goldowitz, supra note 18, at 4.
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continuation of such plans through the Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C.). Generally, employers are not allowed a deduction until
the contribution to the employee is included in the employee's
income, even if the employer is an accrual basis taxpayer.74
Applying this general rule to any type of deferred compensation
arrangement, including employer contributions to pension plans,
an employer gets no current deduction for such contributions.
From the employer's perspective, therefore, non-deferred
compensation is preferable, as the employer receives a current
deduction for paying the compensation." To encourage
retirement plans, however, the I.R.C. allows employers to deduct
contributions to "qualified" retirement plans when made.7
The fact that an employer who adopts a qualified plan is
allowed to deduct its contribution, even though there is no current
income inclusion for employees, is perhaps the most significant
impetus for an employer to adopt a qualified plan.77 To receive a
full deduction for plan contributions, the contributions must be
"ordinary and necessary business expenses ' 8 and must comply
with § 404 of the I.R.C., which provides the qualification
requirements under ERISA. 9 Among these requirements are
limitations on the amount of the deduction an employer may
receive.80 The deductibility limits under § 404 are additionally
limited by the "full funding limit" imposed by ERISA's funding
74. See 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006) (providing that the deductible liability generally is
taken into account in the taxable year incurred); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-
1(c)(1)(ii)(A) (2009) (providing that "under the accrual method, a [deductible]
liability is incurred . . . in the taxable year in which all events have occurred that
establish the fact of the liability, the amount of the liability can be determined with
reasonable accuracy, and economic performance has occurred with respect to the
liability).
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 404 (2006).
78. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006). The contributions must be deductible as an "ordinary
and necessary business expense" but for the fact there current inclusion for the
employee.
79. Id.
80. See id. at § 404(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (stating that the amount necessary to satisfy
the minimum funding standard may be deductible if this amount is greater than: (i)
level funding - the remaining unfunded cost of benefits over the remaining future
service of each participant; and (ii) normal cost plus ten year amortization - the
normal cost of the plan, plus any unfunded supplementary costs, amortized over ten
years).
2010] ERISA
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
rules.81 The limit is expressed as the excess of a percentage 2 of a
plan's current liabilities over its assets.83  To generate revenue,
Congress has lowered the full funding limit to reduce the amount
of available deductions. 84 Congress has also raised the full funding
limit out of a concern that too low a limit leads to unsound plan
accounting and unduly restricts plan funding. 5
Congress often legislates through the tax law, and this is
especially true in the context of retirement plans. Much of the
discussion on pension reform requires analyses of specific
provisions of the I.R.C.86  A more general consideration of
budgetary and fiscal policy issues is also essential to the
discussion. 87
111. THE PROBLEM OF INCREASED LONGEVITY AND POTENTIAL
ADJUSTMENTS TO THE RETIREMENT PLAN SYSTEM
A. The Problem of Increased Longevity
Life expectancy is continually increasing. The average life
expectancy (at birth) for people born in 1900 is age forty-seven,
sixty-eight for people born in 1950,88 and seventy-eight for those
born in 2005.89 Increasing longevity contributes to the more
general phenomenon of population aging.9° Population projections
show that the world median age will rise from 26.4 in 2000 to 36.8
in 2050.91 Changes in fertility and mortality will lead to a
81. See id. at § 412(c)(7)(A)(i)(II).
82. The percentage has vacillated - depending on Congress's revenue appetite, it
has imposed harsher full funding limit to limit deductions and raised full funding
limits to enlarge the available deductions. See Kennedy and Shultz, supra note 39, at
206.
83. See id. at 207.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See infra Part IV.
87. Id.
88. Goldowitz, supra note 18, at 1.
89. Id.
90. See Mehmet S. Tosun, Global Aging and Fiscal Policy with International
Labor Mobility: A Political Economy Perspective, IMF WORKING PAPER SERIES, No.
05/140 (July 2005).
91. Id. at 3.
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significant increase in the share of the elderly?9 Trends of
increasing longevity and population aging are especially
pronounced in advanced economies like the United States.93 An
important consequence of population aging "is increasing fiscal
pressure through higher government spending on social security,
health care, and other welfare programs for the elderly." 94 To
alleviate such fiscal strains, policymakers may initiate reforms in
the area of private sector pension plans. Reform in this area may
quickly become an imperative as the increasing longevity of the
workforce, along with other demographic and economic changes,
make it uncertain whether the United States can provide
retirement income and medical benefits to the future elderly at
levels comparable to the income and benefits provided today.9
The problem resulting from longevity is not difficult to
grasp. Lengthening life spans "will lead to a major shift in the
balance among the young, the working, and the elderly," with the
shift posing serious implications for the aggregate savings rates.96
As workers live longer, they will outlive their retirement savings
unless measures are taken to increase savings to cover their
extended periods of life.9  To prevent a deterioration of
retirement living standards, policymakers may seek reforms to
strengthen the legs of the so-called three-legged stool.98 Indeed,
longevity gains will saddle the stool with a troublesome load, but
what can Congress do to prevent the legs from snapping? This
article considers reforms aimed at private sector retirement plans.
Longevity-based adjustments to Social Security and reforms aimed
at individual savings are beyond the scope of this article; however,
some of the reforms discussed below necessarily involve normative
valuations of government financed social insurance. 99
92. See Peter S. Heller Aging, Savings, and Pensions in the Group of Seven
Countries: 1980-2025, IMF WORKING PAPER SERIES, No. 89/13 (Feb. 2006).
93. See Tosun, supra note 90, at 4.
94. Id. at 3.
95. S. REP. No. 107-158, at 24 (2002).
96. Heller, supra note 92, at 5.
97. See id. (explaining further that these demographic trends may lead to a
decline in private savings).
98. See Dilley, supra note 14.
99. See infra Part IV.
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B. Potential Solutions
In the context of private pension reform, two basic
responses to the challenge of heightened life-expectancy exist -
increasing savings and offsetting longevity. Reforms aimed at
increasing the amount of savings to account for heightened life-
expectancies may be desirable in certain circumstances, as
described below, but an over-reliance on reforms of this type will
impel a host of inefficiencies.1°° Offsetting longevity, on the other
hand, is a lower cost alternative for preserving retirement living
standards.01 Offsetting longevity simply means to shorten the
duration between retirement and death. To effect reforms that
offset longevity, Congress can incentivize the deferral of
retirement.
C. Increasing Savings
Congress may pursue a range of possible reforms aimed at
increasing retirement savings. The range includes both direct and
indirect measures. A direct measure may include increasing the
level of funds flowing into retirement plans. More indirect
measures may include some combination of deferring the
distribution of retirement benefits and strengthening the
investment experiences of retirement plan funds. Any reform
seeking to inflate the American nest egg would, in theory, help
solve the problem of increasing longevity. The problems attendant
to implementing reforms of this nature, however, may overwhelm
the possible virtues. Nonetheless, bolstering savings is a logical
response to increasing life expectancies. Reforms that would
increase savings may include: increasing the amount of money
going into qualified retirement plans by increasing contribution
levels and accelerating vesting requirements; increasing the
amount of money staying in retirement plans by tightening funding
requirements and deferring distributions; and increasing the
amount of money earned by funds by enhancing plans' investment
opportunities.
100. See infra Part III.C.
101. See infra Part IV.A.
[Vol. 14
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1. Increasing the Amount of Money Going into Plans
A direct way to increase the amount of money available to
future retirees is to increase the amount of funds going into
retirement plans. ERISA and the I.R.C. operate in tandem to
govern nearly every dimension of retirement plans 02 and provide
rules affecting plan contribution levels and vesting requirements. 103
If legislators want to encourage a greater flow of money into
retirement plans, they can adjust these rules to increase
contribution levels and accelerate vesting. Such adjustments could
result in a larger, more secure nest egg for future retirees
participating in these plans.
a. Raising Contribution Levels
Under current law, a plan does not qualify unless it
provides that benefits or contributions will not be in excess of
certain limitations. °4 In the case of defined benefit plans,' °5 a
qualified plan must limit the maximum contributions and other
additions that may be allocated on behalf of a plan participant) °6
In addition, the plan must limit the maximum amount of annual
benefits that may be paid to a participant from the plan. °7 On its
face, this latter rule has savings-enhancing attributes, as it prevents
frontloaded payout structures, promotes more steady, annuity-like
payout structures, and stabilizes the supply of plan assets by
limiting the annual payout liability. But prior to the payout of
benefits, accruals of such benefits are always subject to limitations
that correspond to the payout limitations.'9 Thus, the current
payout limitations seem to be tied more to revenue concerns109
102. See supra Part II.D.
103. See infra Part III.C.1 A, B (discussing contribution and funding rules
under ERISA).
104. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(16) (2006).
105. See supra Part II.C (explaining defined benefit plans).
106. 26 U.S.C. § 415(c) (2006).
107. Id. at § 415(b).
10& Id. at §§ 415(c) and § 415(d).
109. In other words, the payout limitation rules just operate has part of the overall
amount of money an employer can contribute to a qualified plan, and from a
Revenue perspective, Treasury has to put some ceiling on the current deduction
20101
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than to retiree-welfare concerns. As a means to providing greater
savings to future retirees with greater life expectancies, however,
Congress may increase the contribution limits imposed by I.R.C. §
415. The maximum contribution is currently subject to both a
dollar limitation and a percentage of compensation limitation.' °
The two limits for , defined benefit plan are disjunctive, and the
lesser of the two limitations is to apply."' The dollar limit is
$160,000,112 and the percentage of compensation limit is 100
percent of the participant's average total compensation for the
highest three consecutive years of service."
Defined contribution plans"4  are subject to similar
limitations."5 A participant's account under a defined contribution
plan cannot receive "annual additions" greater than the lesser of
.. 116
$40,000 or 100 percent of the participant's compensation. The
term "annual addition" is defined broadly and includes employer
contributions, employee contributions, and forfeitures."'
Congress may effect an increase in contribution levels in
two ways. First, it may simply increase maximum limitation
amounts. Raising the maximum amount of contributions that may
be allocated annually on behalf of a participant under a qualified
plan would cause employers and employees 118 to contribute
greater amounts because such amounts would be deductible."9
Greater contributions would constitute an increase in retirement
afforded to employers under qualified plans. The current deduction with no
concomitant inclusion for employees is a major burden on U.S. revenue. See
Goldowitz, supra note 18.
110. See 26 U.S.C. § 415 (2006).
111. See id. at § 415(1).
112. Id. at § 415(b)(1)(A). The dollar limit was increased to $160,000 in 2002, and
the Regulations provide that is amount is to be raised in $5,000 increments for future
cost of living adjustments (COLA's). See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(17)-1 (2009). Thus,
for example, the amount was increased $5,000 every between 2002 and 2006 so that
the dollar limit in 2006 was $175,000. See id.
113. See 26 U.S.C. § 414(b)(1) (2006).
114. See supra Part II.C (explaining defined contribution plans).
115. 26 U.S.C. § 415(c) (2006).
116. Id. at § 415(c)(1)(A), (B).
117. See id. at § 415(c)(2)(A)-(C) (explaining "forfeitures").
118. In the case of defined contribution plans or where participants under a
defined benefit plan also have access to participation in a defined contribution plan.
119. 26 U.S.C. § 404 (2006).
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savings, and increasing retirement savings ostensibly helps to
resolve the issue of increasing longevity.
Secondly, Congress may narrow the meanings of the terms
"annual benefit" and "annual addition." In the context of defined
benefit plans, some items are not included as annual benefits. For
example, voluntary employee contributions120  and rollover
contributions12' are currently excluded. By expanding the scope of
items not included by the term "annual benefit," defined benefit
plans will be able to receive greater levels of contributions without
becoming disqualified.
The Treasury Department issued regulations in 2006 under
which the term "annual benefit" does not include certain
survivor 122 and ancillary benefits123 unrelated to the retirement
benefits. 124 Congress may consider adding to this list. In addition,
it may opt to adjust the ancillary benefits rules. Combining a
contraction of the term "annual benefit" (to exclude ancillary
benefits) with a liberalization of the rules governing ancillary
benefits could achieve a powerful increase in retirement savings.
More particularly, if the rules pertaining to ancillary health
benefits were liberalized, future retirees would be better able to
cope with rising healthcare and living costs. Under I.R.C. §
401(h), a pension plan "may provide for the payment of benefits
120. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.415(b)-l(b)(2)(E)(iv) (2009). If voluntary employee
contributions are made to the plan, the portion of the plan to which voluntary
employee contributions are made is treated as a defined contribution plan pursuant
to § 414(k) and, accordingly, is a defined contribution plan pursuant to § 1.415(c)-
I(a)(2)(i). id. Accordingly, the portion of a plan to which voluntary employee
contributions are made is not a defined benefit plan within the meaning of paragraph
(a)(2) of this section and is not taken into account in determining the annual benefit
under the portion of the plan that is a defined benefit plan. Id.
121. See id. at § 1.415(b)-1(b)(2)(E)(iv). In the case of rollover contributions from
a defined contribution plan to a defined benefit plan to provide an annuity
distribution, the annual benefit attributable to those rollover contributions for
purposes of § 415(b) is determined by applying the rules of section 411(c). Id.
122. See id. at § 1.415(b)-(1). Survivor benefits payable to a surviving spouse
under a qualified joint and survivor annuity as defined by § 417(b) to the extent
survivor benefits would not be payable if the participant's benefits was not being paid
as a qualified joint and survivor annuity. Id.
123. A pension plan may provide for the payment of a pension due to disability
and may also provide for the payment of incidental death benefits through insurance
or otherwise; it may also provide for health and medical benefits pursuant to §
401(h). See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2009).
124. See id. at § 1.415(b)-(1).
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for sickness, accident, hospitalization, and medical expenses of
retired employees" if the benefits are subordinate to the plan's
retirement benefits, are held in a separate account, and are
reasonable and ascertainable.'
Under the current regulations, the medical benefits
described in § 401(h) are considered subordinate to the retirement
benefits if at all times the aggregate of contributions to provide
such medical benefits (together with any life insurance protection)
does not exceed twenty-five percent of the aggregate
contributions.126 If, for instance, this amount were raised to thirty-
five percent,27 and the exclusion of ancillary benefits from the
term "annual benefits" is preserved, then employers would be able
to set aside larger amounts for participants without jeopardizing
the qualified status of the plan. And because rising health care
costs will add to the burden of financing greater life
expectancies, 12 § 401(h) appears to be a worthy policy lever -
especially if pulled in tandem with Treasury Regulation § 1.415(b)-
1.129
If Congress were inclined to raise the contribution limits
under the ancillary benefit rules, particularly under § 401(h),
would the increase of contributions for such benefits be currently
deductible for employers? Even if employers were not entitled to
currently deduct these additional ancillary contributions, at least
they would have the option to make such contributions without
losing the plan's qualification. For a change to truly have a
profound impact on future retirement savings levels, however, the
current deduction incentive seems indispensable.3 °
In the context of defined contribution plans, Congress may
narrow the term "annual additions."'31 In the not so distant past,
125. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(h)(1)-(3) (2006).
126. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-14(c) (2009).
127. The thirty-five percent is used simply as an illustration. Raising the
percentage by any amount would provide a similar effect.
128. What is particularly interesting, but beyond the scope of this paper, is the
reality that rising health care is both a cause of and a burden on heightened life
expectancies.
129. Providing for the exclusion of survivor benefits and ancillary benefits from
the term "annual additions."
130. See supra Part II.D.
131. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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however, Congress has gone the other direction by expanding the
term "annual additions" to include, for any limitation year, any
forfeitures allocated to an employee's account balance and all
employee contributions made during the limitation year.3 2 Like
narrowing the term "annual benefits" in the context of defined
benefit plans, narrowing the term "annual additions" may bolster
retirement savings.
b. Accelerating Vesting
In order to be qualified, a plan must also comply with
minimum vesting standards. 33 While qualified plans must limit
their contributions so that participants' annual benefits or annual
additions do not exceed certain amounts,3  they must also comply
with minimum standards regarding when benefits become
nonforfeitable 3 1 Under a qualified defined benefit plan,
amounts3 6 derived from non-elective employer contributions must
vest at least as quickly as five years13 or, alternatively, seven138
years. Amounts derived from employees' contributions must
always be fully vested.39
It may seem out of place to include vesting rules in a
discussion on reforms that "increase the amount of money going
into plans."'1 40 This is because vesting does not directly affect the
132. See Tax Revenue Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1106(e)(2) (1986).
133. See 26 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006).
134. See supra Part III.C.1.
135. See 26 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006).
136. Referring to amounts of "accrued benefits."
137. A plan satisfies ERISA's vesting requirements "if an employee who has
completed at least five years of service has a nonforfeitable right to 100 percent of
employee's accrued benefit derived from employers contributions." §
411(a)(2)(A)(ii). Such a vesting schedule is known as "cliff vesting." See Kennedy
and Shultz, supra note 39, at 78.
138. A plan satisfies ERISA's vesting requirements "if an employee has a
nonforfeitable right to a percentage of the employee's accrued benefit derived from
employer contributions" that is equal to twenty percent after three years, forty
percent for the fourth year, sixty percent for the fifth year, eighty percent for the
sixth year, and 100 percent for the seventh year or more. See § 411(a)(2)(A)(iii).
Such a vesting schedule is known as "graded vesting." See Kennedy and Shultz,
supra note 39, at 78.
139. See 26 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006).
140. See supra Part III.C.1.
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amount of money flowing into a plan - the "vested portion of an
employee's benefit means the portion of the accrued plan benefit
to which an employee is entitled to if he or she leaves prior to the
plan's normal retirement date. 1 41 From the employee's
perspective, therefore, faster vesting may increase the amount of
money going into the plan for his benefit. This may be particularly
important as the labor markets in many industries are becoming
increasingly mobile and susceptible to turnover. 142 If, for instance,
qualified defined benefit plans were bound by vesting schedules
providing for 100% nonforfeitability of accrued benefits after
eighteen months of service , then workers, particularly those who
frequently separate from their employers, whether voluntarily or
involuntarily, will enjoy an increase in retirement savings.
Tinkering with ERISA's minimum vesting standards may,
however, deprive employers of a powerful tool for creating a
culture of loyalty and commitment. The more an employer loses
the ability to defer the vesting of participants' benefits, the less it is
able to incentivize participants to stay. Economists have
thoroughly demonstrated the efficiencies of long term investment
in human capital.' 44 Additionally, to the extent that employers
wish to compete for labor among cohorts that are inherently
mobile or prone to frequent turnover, defined contribution plans
already offer a flexible alternative. Therefore, tightening vesting
standards for qualified defined benefit plans seems to be overly
burdensome for many types of employers.
141. Kennedy and Shultz, supra note 39, at 77.
142. See MURAT TASCI AND KYLE FEE, ECONOMIC TRENDS: THE INCIDENT AND
DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (Sept. 1,
2009), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends /2009/0909 /02ecoact.cfm.
143. As opposed to current minimum vesting schedules. See generally 26 U.S.C. §
411 (2006) (providing the minimum vesting standards).
144. See Robert J. Barro, Human Capital: Growth, History, and Policy - A Session
to Honor Stanley Engerman, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 2,12 (2001).
145. See supra Part II.C (illustrating the flexible nature of defined contribution
plans).
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2. Increasing the Amount of Money Staying in Plan Trusts
a. Tightening Funding Rules
ERISA prescribes pension funding rules "to determine
how much a firm sponsoring a defined benefit pension plan must
contribute to its plans each year."' 46 One of the primary issues
ERISA sought to redress was the under-funding of pension
plans. An individual plan's funding requirements depend on a
set of actuarial assumptions, and ERISA prescribes rules regarding
the assumptions that employer-sponsors must use to measure plan
liabilities and assets.14 Some types of plans are, however, exceptedS149
from the funding requirements. Namely, certain types of
(defined contribution) plans such as profit sharing and stock bonus
plans are excepted.5 Although, minimum funding standards do
apply to defined contribution money purchase plans and target
benefit plans.51
Notwithstanding ERISA's reforms, under-funded plans still
plague the system.112  Recently, "the level of total plan under-
146. See Charles Ford et al., Weaknesses in Defined Benefit Pension Funding
Rules: A Look at the Largest Plans, 1995-2002, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 351,363 (2006).
147. See CONF. COM. JOINT EXPLANATION (Part IV Funding) for Pub. L. No. 93-
406 (ERSIA).
148. See Ford, supra note 146 (illustrating that for plan years 2004 and 2005, the
I.R.C. specifies that the interest rate used to calculate a plan's current liability must
fall within 90 to 100 percent of the weighted average of the rate on an index of long-
term investment-grade corporate bonds during the four-year period ending on the
last day before the beginning of the plan year). Similarly, rules dictate that sponsors
report an actuarial value of assets that must be based on reasonable assumptions and
must take into account the assets' market value. Id. This value may differ in any
given year, within a specified range, from the current market value of plan assets,
which plans also report. Id.
149. See 26 U.S.C. § 412(b) (2006).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. In the spring of 2005, "United Airlines' parent UAL Corp. requested that the
bankruptcy court terminate four of its under-funded defined benefit plans to bypass
its required annual pension contributions .... While such huge UAL under-funded
deficiencies might be difficult for certain participants and retirees to understand in
light of original legislative intent, compliance with the funding rules never guaranteed
that benefits accrued to date would be fully funded." Kathryn J. Kennedy, Pension
Funding Reform: It's Time to Get the Rules Right (Part II) BNA TAX ANALYST, 108
TAX NOTES 1049, 1059 (2005) [hereinafter Kennedy].
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funding has increased rapidly, from about $39 billion in 2000 to an
amount estimated to exceed $450 billion as of September 30,
2004. '"153 Termination of large plans by bankrupt sponsors
threatens to push the private pension system more quickly into
insolvency, generating greater pressure on Congress to respond.54
But what can Congress do? If employers are already unable to
satisfy current funding standards, what will tightening the current
standards do other than impose greater costs on distressed
employers in a distressed economy? Indeed, changing the rules
midstream would "subject financially strapped employers to
increased funding costs at a time when they could least afford it,
while imposing additional administrative expenses on financially
healthy employers who ask, 'where's the additional benefit for the
extra cost?"'155
The challenges presented by under-funded plans are
daunting, and lawmakers have been busy working towards a
solution. 1 6  Increasing longevity is an additional strain on the
liabilities of defined benefit plans and will continue to exacerbate
funding deficiencies. At the same time, an aging population with
increasing life expectancy creates an even greater necessity for
viable pension plans. Because the phenomenon that begs for a
solution is itself a contributing factor to the problem, the funding
crisis at hand cannot be fixed by simply subjecting plan sponsors to
more exacting funding requirements. If Congress too suddenly
accelerates funding obligations, it would force many employers to
liquidate or to become insolvent.9 Such a result would further
strain an already beleaguered Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC), the federal corporation created by ERISA
153. Ford, supra note 146, at 357.
154. Id. (stating that the obvious action for Congress to take against undefended
plans is to enhance the PBGC, the federal insurer of defined benefit plans).
155. Kennedy, supra note 152, at A.
156. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, Description of the Chairman's Mark of "The
National Employee Savings and Trust Equity Guarantee Act of 2005," JCX-56-05
(July 22, 2005); see also Patrick Purcell, CRS Report for Congress on S. 219, Aug. 12,
2005, available at https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream /handle/10207/4186/RS222
21_20050812.pdf.
157. See infra Part IV.
158. See Ford, supra note 146, at 354 (illustrating that many employers are
increasingly unable to fund their plans).
159. See Kennedy and Shultz, supra note 39.
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to insure defined benefit pension plans.' 6°  With increased
liabilities, the PBGC would likely raise the premiums it charges
employers, and any substantial increase in PBGC premiums may
preclude future adoptions of defined benefit plans and may
encourage healthy employers with funded defined benefit plans to
leave the system in response to the added administrative costs.
161
Congress is at a delicate crossroad; it has the opportunity
"to legislate avoiding the next taxpayer bailout for under-funded
defined benefit plans while encouraging the development of
existing and future defined benefit plans.' ' 162 Defined benefit plans
may be an endangered species, as more and more employers are
opting for various types of defined contribution plans instead ,163
but, for a variety of reasons, public policy should encourage the
continuation and formation of defined benefit plans. 64 From a
policy perspective, defined benefits are worth preserving because
they are designed to provide replacement income as an annuity
stream of payments - thereby shifting investment and mortality
risks to employers, who are better able to spread those costs over
the entire participant population and over the timeline
represented by the employer's existence. 65  While defined
contribution plans provide an invaluable supplement to retirement
savings, they "should not be regarded as replacements of the
defined benefit model."1 66
160. See Welcome to PBGC, http://www.pbgc.gov/ (last visited January 30, 2010).
The PBGC currently protects the pensions of nearly 44 million American workers
and retirees in more than 29,000 private single-employer and multiemployer defined
benefit pension plans. Id. It receives no funds from general tax revenues. Id. Its
operations are financed by insurance premiums set by Congress and paid by sponsors
of defined benefit plans, investment income, assets from pension plans trusteed by
PBGC, and recoveries from the companies formerly responsible for the plans. Id.
161. See Kennedy and Shultz, supra note 39.
162. Id. at 907.
163. See infra III.C.3 A.
164. Id. (highlighting the risk shifting that occurs as defined contribution plans
proliferate).
165. See Kennedy, supra note 152.
166. Id.
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b. Deferring Distribution
ERISA governs when a participant in a qualified plan must
begin receiving benefits under the plan.'67 Before 1997, employees
had to start receiving benefits by age 70 .'68 The Small Business
Job Protection Act of 1996 (SBJPA) modified this "required
beginning date," providing that benefits must be paid on April 1 of
the calendar year following the later of: the calendar year in which
the employee attains age 70 ; or the calendar year in which the
employee retires.16' Additionally, the minimum distribution rules
require that a further distribution must be made by "December 31
of each year after [the required beginning date has
commenced].' 7 ° Thus, the rules impose both a required beginning
date upon which the distribution of benefits must commence and a
requirement that such payments must periodically continue
thereafter.
The policy rationale underlying the minimum distribution
rules is to preclude the use of pension accounts as will substitutes -
providing a means for participants to accumulate death benefits
for their heirs without being subject to estate taxation. 7' The
concern over estate tax gaming may be subsumed, however, by the
need to provide retirement income security for an aging
population marked by continually increasing longevity. By making
the minimum distributions rules that apply to qualified plans more
flexible, participants who have access to other monies, either
because they are continuing their employment or because of other
savings, will be more likely to access such benefits on an as-needed
basis only. More generally, deferring distributions will provide
security for increasing longevity in two ways. From the plan's
perspective, the deferral of current payout obligations keeps more
167. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(9) (2006).
168. Id. at § 401(a)(9)(A).
169. See Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, §
1404(a)(C)(i)(I), (II) (1996).
170. See 52 Fed. Reg. 28070 (1996).
171. Robert E. Helm and Brian P. Goldstein, Pension Reform/Simplification - An
Urgent Need: Practical Proposal from the Front Lines, 25 GA. L. REV. 91, 107 (Fall
1990).
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money in the plan today, accumulating earnings tax free,172 thereby
alleviating the burden of complying with funding requirements.
From the participant's perspective, deferral may encourage the
participant to subsist on other resources, thus providing security if
a greater-than- expected lifespan is experienced.
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of adjusting the
minimum distribution rules, "only those who have sufficient other
means to maintain themselves in retirement . . . would actually
benefit from such a delay in required distributions.', 7 3  Most
American workers "continue to retire long before age seventy-five
and need to begin withdrawals from whatever retirement savings
they have in order to meet everyday household needs. 1 74 The
potential benefits of adjusting the minimum distribution rules may
be overwhelmed by this fact. From the plan's perspective, the
funding benefit derived from deferring distribution is a pure
function how many participants actually defer their benefits unless
such deferrals are mandatory. And, of course, mandatory
deferrals would greatly discriminate against lower income
participants who struggle to meet day-to-day expenses. From
participants' perspective, therefore, deferrals may only favor
higher-income retirees, and it is lower-income retirees that will
struggle to provide for increasing longevity.
3. Enhancing the Investment of Performance of Plan Funds
In addition to increasing the level of funds sitting in
qualified retirement plans, policymakers may also attempt to
increase the investment performance of these funds. If plan funds
are able to generate greater returns, and if participants are able to
directly share in these returns,75 then retirees will enjoy larger nest
eggs and will thus have greater security for heightened life
expectancies. To effect such an outcome, policymakers must focus
on two elements--expanding the investment opportunities
172. See Dilley, supra note 14 (explaining that allowing a delay in distributions
would, in effect, give more years of tax-free build-up in account balances).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See supra Part II.C (highlighting the differences between defined benefit and
defined contribution plans).
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available to plans and enhancing participant exposure to plan
investment options.
a. Expanding Investment Opportunities
In the hopes of making plans earn higher returns, Congress
may want to encourage plan investment managers 1 6 to pursue
riskier investments with higher potential returns by dulling the bite
of ERISA's fiduciary provisions. While riskier investments do not
guarantee higher returns, they could theoretically allow some
plans to shoot for higher returns. There are three fiduciary
restraints that tend to affect the investment experience of plan
assets: the duty to diversify,177 the duty to follow plan documents,178
and the duty of prudence."' With respect to the diversity
requirement, Congress chose not to legislate a specific percentage
limit on any one investment.1'8 Instead, diversification under
ERISA depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding
• . 181
each plan and investment. With respect to the requirement to
follow plan documents, a plan fiduciary may be in breach for
investments that run afoul of a plan's idiosyncratic terms, even if
such investments would not violate other fiduciary provisions in
the absence of the plan's terms. 82
176. See ERISA, supra note 1, at § 3(38) (stating that "the term 'investment
manager' means any fiduciary.., who has the power to manage, acquire, or dispose
of any asset of a plan; who is registered as an investment advisor under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ... and has acknowledged in writing that he is a
fiduciary with respect to the plan").
177. See id. at § 404(a)(1)(C) (stating that "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties...
by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses..
."1).
178. See id. at § 404(a)(1)(D) (stating that "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties..
in accordance with plan documents and instruments governing the plan...").
179. See id. at § 404(a)(1)(B) (stating that "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties
with respect to a plan ...with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims.").
180. See Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n and Glaziers and Glassworkers Pension
Plan, 507 F. Supp. 378, 383 (D. Haw. 1980).
181. See id.
182. See Cal. Ironworkers Field Pension Trust v. Loomis Sayles & Co., 259 F.3d
1036, 1044 (9th. Cir. 2001). (observing that "[almong other things, the more
conservative nature of the Welfare Trust's investment goals, the relatively higher
percentage of that Trust's assets that were invested in inverse floater [sic], and the
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More than any other fiduciary restraint, the duty of
prudence discourages plan investment managers from seeking
aggressive returns. In determining whether an investment is
reasonably prudent, the investment manager must take "into
consideration the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain (or
other return) associated with the investment or investment course
of action."'83  The prudence is thus twofold in nature - first, it
requires the manager to conduct due diligence with respect to an
investment, and second, it requires the manager to refrain from
excessive risks.' In other words, an investment that is excessively
risky cannot be deemed prudent because the manager carefully
investigated, considered, and fully understood the investment
185
Furthermore, prudence under ERISA is shaped by the special
nature, purpose, and importance of modern employee benefit
plans.186 Legislative history reflects the need for plans' investment
philosophies to vindicate the principle of retirement income
security.1 87 Nonetheless, if Congress wishes to enlarge retirement
benefits by bolstering plan investment returns, loosening ERISA's
prudence requirement is a logical place to start.
Rather than implementing affirmative language to soften
the prudence requirement, Congress could encourage plans which
provide for "individual accounts" and permit participants to
"exercise control" over the assets in their accounts.'9 Plan
participants that exercise such control over their accounts are not
themselves fiduciaries, and other plan fiduciaries will not be liable
for any loss or breach that results from the participants' exercise of
189control over the investment. Put another way, no one is liable
for participant losses resulting from the participant's own informed
fact that the Welfare Trust performed below its benchmark, the degree of investment
of Trust assets in inverse floaters was imprudent for that Trust.").
183. Id. at 1043.
184. See Fink v. National Savings and Trust Co. 772 F.2d 951 (1985).
185. See id.
186. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, 93D CONG., 2D SESS. (directing courts to interpret
the prudent person rule "bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee
benefit plans").
187. See id.
188. ERISA, supra note 1, at § 404(c)(1)(A).
189. See In re Enron Corporation, Securities & ERISA Litigation (Tittle v. Enron
Corp.) 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 575 (2003).
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investment choices.' 9° Further proliferating these types of plans,
however, may subject retirement savings to too much risk.' 9'
Given that the fundamental aim of ERISA is retirement income
security, Congress should not transform the American pensioner
into the American speculator, especially in the light of the fact
most pensioners lack the financial acumen to game the markets.
b. Greater Participant Exposure to Plan Investment
Experiences
Regardless of the investment returns a plan generates, no
added benefit passes to the individual participant unless the plan
allows the participant to share in the returns. In the absence of
participant exposure to market risks, gains flowing from liberalized
investment strategies will only benefit the plan sponsor or
employer. Therefore, reforms aimed at expanding plan
investment opportunities are only germane in the context of
defined contribution plans. 92 Again, a distinguishing characteristic
between defined contribution plans and defined benefit plans is
that the former exposes the participant to market risk and the
latter insulates the participant from market risk.'93 A corollary
policy approach to increasing investment performance, therefore,
is to further encourage defined contribution plans.
The emergence of the defined contribution plan as a
replacement for the defined benefit plan has already had injurious
effects on the system. 94 Indeed, "the devolution of the traditional
pension system has left many families unprepared to meet the
challenges of retirement."' 95 As part of the general unraveling of
the "worker safety net," the shift from defined benefit to defined
contribution has hurt the average family.
96
190. Id.
191. See infra Part IV.A 3.B (discussing the dangers of exposing retirement
savings to too much risk).
192. See supra Part II.C.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Dilley, supra note 14, at 254.
196. Id.
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Aside from the concern that the surge of the defined
contribution plan is crumbling the defined benefit pillar, there are
many other problems with policies aimed at increasing plans'
investment performances and exposing participants to market risk.
Most basically, "the purported advantages of defined contribution
schemes can be obtained only at the expense of higher underlying
risks to the incomes of future pensioners."' 97 It is important to
remember that the principal goal of pension policy is retirement
income security.9 There is not much security in a fast-paced
global economy where workers are self-investing their savings
instead of counting on company pensions.' 99
Even amidst a robust economic outlook, mass-injections of
market risk into to the pension system is of questionable policy
prudence. Furthermore, the phenomenon of increasing longevity,
among other factors, presents a less than robust market outlook.
A systematic decline in asset prices "can easily be envisaged from
models that seek to assess the possible impact of the aging of the
population of the industrial economies over the next several
decades." 2°° Equity markets will be particularly affected as the
large cohort of baby boomers moves through the population;
experts expect this phenomenon to create significant volatility in
the markets over the next several decades.0' In addition to
demographic volatility, the new global economy "is more like a
highly dynamic, living organism," where large corporations are
forever threatened with obsolescence by an "internationally
mobile, risk-taking, extraordinarily venturesome entrepreneurial
class of individuals. 2 2 Although capable of producing fabulous
wealth, financial globalization raises systemic risks to new
203heights. Therefore, the philosophy of promoting security in the
retirement system clashes with policies that expose participants
197. Heller, supra note 71.
198. See, ERISA, supra note 1.
199. See Smick, supra note 4, at 2-23.
200. Heller, supra note 71, at 11 (explaining that as elderly baby boomers seek to
sell assets to a younger generation of workers which is smaller in size, aggregate
prices will decline).
201. See id.
202. See Smick, supra note 4, at 20.
203. See id.
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and their benefits to market risk. What is more, the macro-
volatility looming on the horizon should prompt Congress to
ponder the other side of the coin - that is, it may need to further
insulate the retirement system from such volatility by redefining
traditional notions of risk-appropriate pension investments.
IV. OFFSETTING LONGEVITY BY DEFERRING RETIREMENT
Congress may pursue a variety of policies in hopes of
strengthening retirement security in the face of increasing
longevity. Virtually all of the options at its disposal, however, are
riddled with caveats. While no remedial policy in this context is
cost free, Congress must pursue a course of action capable of
yielding results with relatively low macroeconomic costs. This
must entail an economic offset of the increasing longevity
phenomenon, and a macro-level deferral of retirement will provide
the necessary offset.2 0
A. The Policy Advantage of Deferring Retirement
Among the policies aimed at enhancing the quantity (or
quality) of retirement savings, reversing the deterioration of
defined benefit plans is desirable, particularly from the perspective
of retiree security and welfare. Thus, as a solution to the problem
presented by increasing longevity and an aging population, it
might seem obvious to simply encourage the formation and
continuation of defined benefit plans.205 There is no question,
restoring the defined benefit paradigm may be an important part
of the broader solution. In the absence of a complimentary
strategy, however, restoring defined benefit plans does not offer
the U.S. retirement system the strongest long-term solution.
Although this policy would confer annuity-structured retirement
income on a larger number of retirees, it would simply shift the
longevity risk to the employer. Granted, it may be sound public
policy for employers to bear a greater share of longevity risk. But
as longevity gains become increasingly systemic, is it good policy to
204. See infra Part IV.A.
205. See supra Part II.C (discussing defined benefit plans and annuity risk).
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simply heap the excess risk on employer-sponsors? Not only
would an unmitigated shift of longevity risk encourage employers
to exit the private pension system, it would also pressure many
already fledgling companies into failure. 2°6 Even financially sound
employer-sponsors would become less globally competitive. 2°7
Therefore, offsetting longevity is a policy imperative. Any broad
based reform aimed at restoring and proliferating the defined
benefit paradigm must be accompanied by policies aimed at
deferring retirement.
B. Reforms Deferring Retirement
There are many combinations and variations of reforms
that may effect a deferral of retirement, and there is plenty of
room for Congress to be creative in this area. Some reforms may
target the tax qualification rules, such as implementing optional or
mandatory deferrals of benefit distributions under qualified
plans.2° Congress may also pursue more qualitative approaches;
for example, it may encourage employers to do a better job of
encouraging, improving, motivating, and retaining older labor.2 9
Regardless of the policy or combination of policies Congress may
choose, it is important that it act quickly to address the problem of
increasing longevity.
C. The Economics of Deferring Retirement
Among the economic effects of deferring retirement are
the impact on human capital, retirement savings, and revenue.
1. Effect on Human Capital: Externalities of an Aged Workforce
A macro-level deferral of retirement would necessarily
result in an older workforce. Although somewhat peripheral to
206. See generally, Kennedy, supra note 48.
207. See Smick, supra note 4, at 214-241 (discussing how class driven domestic
policies can hinder global competitiveness).
208. See supra Part III 2.B (discussing some of the advantages and disadvantages
of deferring distributions).
209. See infra Part IV.CA.
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retirement savings and pension economics, it is important to
consider the human capital consequences of deferring retirement.
The particular implications of an older workforce may vary from
industry to industry, but there are advantages and disadvantages of
retirement deferral.
A key advantage of deferring retirement is that it will
prevent the runaway emergence of an idle retirement class - a
disproportionately large class of economic non-producers.2 m0  A
systemic swell of old-aged dependency ratios will result in
economic waste, primarily in the form of labor underutilization
and fiscal drain.21' Economists and policymakers emphasize the
necessity to "pull older workers out of inactivity into
employment. 2 12 Many of today's retirees are both able and willing
to continue working,23 and considering the financial burden of
heightened life expectancies, they should continue to work.
However, employers are doing little to encourage older workers to
214
remain. Many older workers believe that their supervisors have
denied them developmental opportunities because of their age."'
These workers profess that it is not a lack of ability or will that is
driving them into retirement; instead, they are being "pushed out
by a perceived lack of respect and reward for the work they do.,
216
To effect a broad deferral of retirement, therefore, policymakers
must encourage employers to attract, retain, and motivate older
workers.
From the perspective of employers, however, older workers
do pose certain challenges. For example, there is ample statistical
210. See Tosun, supra note 90, at 3 (discussing the economic consequences of
increases in the old-aged dependency ratio). An important consequence of
population aging is increasing fiscal pressure through higher government spending on
social security, health care, and other welfare programs for the elderly. Id. This may
mean lower government spending for other programs that primarily benefit the
young. Id.
211. See id.
212. Ken Mayhew and Bob Rijkers, How to Improve the Human Capital of Older
Workers or the Sad Tale of the Magic Bullet, in EC-OECD SEMINAR ON HUMAN
CAPITAL AND LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE, 2 (Dec. 8,2004).
213. See Press Release, The Conference Board, Older Workers are Staying on the
Job for Economic Reasons, Dec. 2, 2002, http://www.conference-board.org/utilities/
pressDetail.cfm?pressID=2022.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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evidence showing that older workers experience higher rates of
illness and disability, which poses a cost to employers either
directly or indirectly.217 Furthermore, retaining older workers may
create a potential for "cross generational conflict. '218 Considering
also that older employees tend to draw higher because under
seniority based compensation arrangements, employers may be
particularly sensitive these challenges.219
Another adverse externality that could stem from deferring
retirement is a displacement of younger human capital. That is, if
Congress enacts policies encouraging employers to retain older
workers, and assuming labor demand does not experience
dramatic shifts, younger labor cohorts will be pushed under the
market.220  The result would be an underutilization of younger
labor. Arguably, underutilizing younger labor generates a greater
inefficiency than underutilizing older labor, due to the relative
useful lives of the cohorts. Labor inefficiency may further stem
from the mental and physical deterioration, as well as the skill
obsolescence, associated with older labor.2 ' Therefore, policies
encouraging the retention of older workers may not be free from
adverse consequences.
Concededly, some adverse externalities could stem from
deferring retirement. However, these externalities are
counterbalanced by a number of factors. In response to statistics
showing that older workers are more prone to disability and
illness, many labor experts posit that these risks may be
outweighed by positive attributes inherent in older workers.2
These positive attributes include: valuable knowledge and skill,
including technical skill unique to long tenure, thus limited in
supply; institutional wisdom; loyalty to the organization; the
217. See Anthony P. Rienzi, Productivity for the Ages: Maximizing the
Contributions of Older Labor, in INSIGHTOUT, (Buck Consultants, an ACS Co.) (Feb.
2009).
218. Id.
219. See id.
220. See Tosun, supra note 90.
221. See Mayhew and Rijkers, supra note 212.
222. See Rienzi, supra note 217, at 2.
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unique capacity to provide mentorship for younger workers;22 3 and
lower rates of turnover and unscheduled absences.2
In response to concerns that deferring retirement will
displace younger labor, many economists suggest that
underutilizing younger labor actually yields a more efficient result
than underutilizing older labor.2  This is because younger
individuals possess greater "educational malleability," and are
better situated to continue their education. 6 Furthermore, by
reducing the fiscal pressure to provide for the elderly, deferring
retirement will enable greater social spending for education.227
Essentially, deferring retirement will defer labor market entry;
individuals will retire later but will also begin working later.
Delayed entry into the market will encourage greater investment
in education, which in turn will result in increased specialization
among younger cohorts.2' The overall efficiency of human capital
will be enhanced, as younger cohorts will enter the market with
greater skill and knowledge.229
With respect to skill obsolescence associated with older
labor, any reform aimed at deferring retirement should encourage
223. Providing a cogent offset to possible the risk of "cross generational conflict."
See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
224. See Rienzi, supra note 217, at 2 (discussing ways employers can improve their
ratio of productivity to labor cost (RO)). Recognizing [that older workers offer
these specific positive attributes], employers must seek to optimize the advantages of
retaining their older workers, while diminishing the disadvantages. Id. If this can be
accomplished in a way that promotes collaboration and understanding across all
generations, employers can significantly improve their talent ROL. Id.
225. See Tosun, supra note 90, at 3-6.
226. But see Mayhew and Rijkers, supra note 212, at 7 (suggesting that because
younger workers do in fact possess greater "malleability," they are more amenable to
firm-inculturation and can benefit more from firm-provided training programs).
227. See infra Part IV.C.3 (discussing the impact of deferring retirement on
revenue). See also Tosun, supra note 90, at 5 (illustrating the significance of the
political economy consideration of the relationship between population aging and
education spending).
228. See Benjamin F. Jones, The Burden of Knowledge and the Death of the
Renaissance Man (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11360, 2005)
(employing econometrics to illustrate the relationship between greater educational
obtainment, greater depth of knowledge within a field and greater specialization).
229. But see id. at 2 (explaining that the economic growth effect one might expect
from higher educational attainment may be offset by the "burden of knowledge"
phenomenon). A substantial portion of the knowledge received from higher
educational obtainment may be comprised of "catching up" knowledge, so increased
educational obtainment may have an attenuated or negative effect on labor
productivity. See id.
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employers to not simply retain older workers, but to invest in their
productivity as well. Certainly, the infirmities of aging diminish
technical skills.n Costs associated with technical skill
obsolescence may be offset by the experience, accumulated
knowledge, and "institutional wisdom" unique to older workers.
Furthermore, concerns over "technical skill" obsolescence,
however, may be silenced by a slowing of the avalanche-like
destruction of natural aging.32 In other words, evidence shows
that increasing longevity manifests itself not just as an extension of
life, but also as an extension of middle-aged vitality.233 And as a
proactive measure to reduce the technical skill obsolescence
associated with aging, employers should establish various forms of
health and wellness programs specifically aimed at middle aged
and elderly workers. Congress may consider making this public
policy by granting a number of tax subsidies for these types of
programs.
Even more significant than technical skill obsolescence,
however, is "economic skill obsolescence," which often takes one
of the following forms: job-specific skills obsolescence as a
consequence of technological or organizational renewal of the
production process; obsolescence due to shifts in the sectoral
structure of employment; or firm-specific obsolescence due to firm
closure or reorganization. 4 To both retain and enhance older
labor, therefore, policymakers should incentivize employers to
invest in the continued training of their older employees. By
investing in continued, firm-specific training and education,
employers can both prevent obsolescence and endear older
employees, thereby facilitating a deferral of retirement.235
Again, a broad-scale deferral of retirement would
necessarily result in an older workforce. While retaining older
230. See Mayhew and Rijkers, supra note 212, at 7.
231. See Rienzi, supra note 217, at 3.
232. See L.A. Gavrilov & N.S. Gavriola, THE BIOLOGY OF LIFESPAN: A
QUANTITATIVE APPROACH, (Harwood Academic Publishers) (1991).
233. See id.
234. Id.
235. See Mayhew and Rijkers, supra note 212, at 2 (emphasizing the need for
pension policy to incentivize older employees to remain in their jobs instead of
settling for retirement).
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labor may generate adverse externalities, these are outweighed by
a number of countervailing factors. Policies deferring retirement,
therefore, would likely yield a net macroeconomic benefit.
2. Savings
Deferring retirement impacts savings in a number of key
ways. First, working longer will allow workers to keep their
accumulated equity in a tax-free trust for a longer period of time
and thus help to ensure that their reserves are sufficient to last
their entire lifetimes.236 Second, it will shorten the window
between retirement and death, thereby lowering the amount of
savings necessary required to provide for retirement.237 Third,
shortening the window between retirement and death will temper
annuity risk.238  By effecting a macro-offset of annuity risk,
shortening the retirement-to-death window will enable a low cost
defined benefit renaissance. Without such an offset, policies
aimed at preserving and proliferating defined benefit plans amidst
increasing longevity will heap excessive risk on employers at an
already shaky time. Deferring retirement, therefore, is an antidote
to pro-retiree policies that use the defined benefit model to shift
annuity and market risks to employers.
Finally, deferring retirement will alleviate employers'
239funding burdens by deferring current payout liabilities. By
softening current liabilities, financially weak employers will be
better able to avoid failure. Preventing the failure of larger plan
sponsors will strengthen the future viability of the private pension
system, which is perhaps the most important leg of the three-
legged stool. For these reasons, policies aimed at deferring
retirement will have a positive impact on retirement savings.
236. See Pension Preservation and Savings Expansion Act of 2003, H.R. 1776,
108th Cong. § 201(a)(2) (2003); See also Dilley, supra note 14, at 264 (discussing the
Portman-Cardin Bill and raising the age for required minimum distributions to
seventy-five).
237. See id.
238. This is regardless of who bears the annuity risk. See supra Part IV.B j 1.
239. See supra Part III.C.2. I A (discussing ERISA funding rules' broader effect
on retirement savings).
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3. Revenue
Congress can implement policies aimed at deferring
retirement without further relying on revenue-corroding incentives
such as raising deductibility limits.240 This is not to suggest that
additional tax incentives have no place in pension reform.4
Coupling a deferral of retirement with a moderate increase in the
tax favorability of qualified plans could offer a synergistic solution
to increasing longevity. This synergistic approach to pension
reform will prevent an over-reliance on tax incentives, thereby
sparing fiscal resources.
Also, to the extent that deferring retirement will enhance
the viability of private pensions, it will save the social security leg
of the proverbial stool from bearing the weight of heightened life
242
expectancies. Any policy aimed at strengthening the private
pension leg of the three legged stool will positively impact revenue
in this way.
V. CONCLUSION
Life expectancy is continually increasing, a phenomenon
that will strain the U.S. retirement system. One way Congress may
address the issue is by reforming the private pension leg of the
three legged stool. It may do this in a number of ways, but
fundamentally, there are two broad categories of possible reform.
First, reforms may attempt to bolster the level retirement savings
that flow from such plans. Second, there are reforms that
incentivize a deferral of retirement. Congress may effect the
former by adjusting ERISA's contribution, vesting, funding,
distribution, and fiduciary provisions.243 It may also preference
defined benefit plans over defined contribution plans.'
44
240. See supra Part II.D (discussing deductibility of employer contributions to
qualified plans).
241. For example, polices aimed at deferring retirement may very well take the
form of tax incentives themselves, such as credits or deductions for employer
investments in the education of older workers. See supra Part IV.C.1.
242. See Heller, supra note 92.
243. See supra Part III.C.1-3.
244. See supra Part IV
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Congress may effect the latter by deferring minimum
distribution dates and by raising the normal retirement age under
ERISA.245 It may also do so by encouraging employers to take
affirmative steps to retain older labor, such as investing in
continued training and offering health and wellness programs.
246
From a macroeconomic perspective, any reform in the area
of private retirement plans should include policies aimed at
deferring retirement. These policies may be enhanced by a
resurgence of defined benefit plans. These policies may also be
complimented by other measures aimed at bolstering retirement
income. But in the face of increasing longevity, deferring
retirement provides the risk offsets necessary for an affordable
renovation of the U.S. retirement system.
245. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (discussing Portman-Cardin Bill).
246. See supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the externalities of an aged workforce).
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